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JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS
Department Editor: Francis T. Crowe*
THE AIR CARRIER'S DUTY TO BARGAIN UNDER THE RAILWAY
LABOR ACT - THE NATIONAL AIRLINES STRIKE
The recent labor difficulties experienced by National Airlines have
brought into sharp relief the duties of the air carrier to bargain under the
Railway Labor Act, as amended.'
The disputes had their beginning in September, 1945 when Maston
O'Neal, one of National's pilots and a member of the Air Line Pilots Asso-
ciation (ALPA), was involved in an accident at the Tampa, Florida, air-
port on one of the carrier's scheduled flights. The carrier discharged him.
He demanded a review of the propriety of his discharge, such review being
provided for in the agreement between the carrier 'and ALPA, the recog-
nized representative of the pilots. This review resulted in a deadlock in
the System Board of Adjustment, comprised of two members selected by
the carrier and two by the union. There was no provision in the agreement
for overcoming this impasse.2
In May, 1947, the National Mediation Board called the parties together,
and it was agreed that the Board would appoint a neutral referee to break
the deadlock. The Board subsequently appointed a member of the Civil
Aeronautics Board staff. ALPA objected to this appointment because of
possible bias. The appointee declined to serve. The Board then chose an-
other referee who was refused by the carrier for no other apparent reason
than that it was exercising its prerogative as it felt the union had done.3
By November, 1947, ALPA issued a strike notice. The National Media-
tion Board persuaded the pilots' union to postpone its walk-out, and the
parties were once again called together for mediation of the dispute. The
carrier offered to have three neutrals appointed. Before reaching an under-
standing ALPA insisted that one was sufficient. The president of ALPA was
called away on official union business and the carrier withdrew its offer.
Meanwhile the International Association of Machinists (IAM), which
had been certified in August 1947, as the legal bargaining representative of
the carrier's clerks, deadlocked with the carrier in December, 1947 over the
latter's demand to have the unlimited right to sub-contract work and union's
demand that no sub-contracting be allowed. During the negotiation period
the carrier granted its clerks, who were not as yet under any contract, a
unilateral wage increase. The carrier's president made several anti-union
statements to his employees which were enforced by further benefits being
granted to the clerks. The IAM took a strike vote. Efforts by the National
* Student Editor, Northwestern University Legal Publications Board.
'The original Act is Title I, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended by 48 Stat. 1185(1934), 45 USCA §151 et seq. (1943). Title II, the air carrier provisions, was
added in 1936, 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 USCA §§181-188 (1940), to make the
complete title, the Railway Labor Act, as amended.
2 For a factual history of the dispute, see the letter written by Frank P.
Douglas, chairman of the National Mediation Board, to Senator McCarran pub-
lished in Aviation Week, March 22, 1948, p. 44. See also Aviation Week, March
15, 1948, p. 11. McNatt, Labor Relations in the Air Transport Industry Under the
Amended Railway Labor Act, 45 U. of Ill. Bulletin, 64 (1948).8 "No reason was given to support such challenge (of the second referee)
except that the Association had protested the appointment of the first designated
referee." Emergency Board No. 62's Report to the President, p. 8, "In re Certain
Differences between National Airlines, Inc. and certain of their employees repre-
sented by the Air Line Pilots Association, International, and the International
Association of Machinists."
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Mediation Board failed to bring the parties to any agreement. Arbitration
was agreed to by the IAM, but on December 11, 1947, the carrier refused to
accept "at this time". On January 23, 1948, the IAM clerks walked out. The
Mediation Board, then, requested the carrier to reassure the striking em-
ployees that they would not be discriminated against if they returned to
work which the carrier did on the Yollowing day but the clerks stayed out.4
On February 3, 1948, because they were apprehensive of inadequate
maintenance and believed the carrier had breached its agreement of May
1947, to accept a neutral referee, the ALPA employees struck.5 The next
day the carrier notified the National Mediation Board that it would accept
the appointment of one neutral to settle the two year old dispute. On the
fifth, the National Mediation Board requested the parties to meet February
7, 1948, and it informed ALPA of the carrier's proposal. The union accepted
this proposal by phone. On the seventh, the president of ALPA and an at-
torney for the president of the carrier met. The carrier informed the Board
that it had discharged all its ALPA pilots the day before.8 Further efforts
to compose the differences ceased.
The carrier resumed operations with newly hired pilots, and the strike
continued. 7 The Mediation Board recommended to the President of the
United States that he appoint an emergency fact-finding board, pursuant to
the powers given him under the Railway Labor Act, as amended, to in-
vestigate the ALPA dispute. On May 15, 1948, the President appointed
an emergency board. After hearings were under way, IAM convinced the
Mediation Board that its controversy be disposed of at the same time. On
June 3, 1948, the President redesignated the emergency board.8
JURISDICTION OF EMERGENCY BOARD
This board was at once faced with a challenge of its jurisdiction.9 Sec-
tion 10 of Title 1 of the Railway Labor Act, as amended, provides:
"If a dispute between a carrier and its employees be not adjusted under
the foregoing provisions of this Act and should, in the judgment of the
Mediation Board, threaten substantially to interrupt interstate commerce
to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country of essential
transportation service, the Mediation Board shall notify the President,
who may thereupon, in his discretion, create a board to investigate and
report respecting such dispute."'1
It was contended by the carrier that by its resumption of scheduled flights
there had been no interruption of commerce such as contemplated in the
legislation.
4 On January 24, 1948, the IAM mechanics stopped work to avoid crossing the
clerk's picket line.
5 Aviation Week, February 16, 1948, p. 10.
6 Aviation Week, March 15, 1948, p. 11.
7 Aviation Week, March 8, 1948, p. 40.
8 Emergency Board No. 62 was originally created by Executive Order No.
9958, dated May 15, 1948. The Board was redesignated on June 3, 1948 to inves-
tigate the IAM strike by Executive Order No. 9965. The Board was headed by
Grady Lewis, as chairman, with Walter V. Schaefer, Professor of Law at North-
western University Law School, and Curtis W. Roll, as members.
9 American Aviation Daily, May 25, 1948, p. 127.
10 48 Stat. 1197 (1934), 45 USCA §160 (1940). This section of Title I is made
applicable to air carriers by Title II, §201, 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 USCA §181
(1940) which provides: "All of the provisions of title I of this Act, except the
provisions of section 3 thereof, are extended to and shall cover every common
carrier by air engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, and every carrier by
air transporting mail for or under contract with the United States Government,
and every air pilot or other person who performs any work as an employee or
subordinate official of such carrier or carriers, subject to its or their continuing
authority to supervise and direct the manner of rendition of his service."
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It may be a valid argument that this section of the Act may not apply
to air carriers with the same force that it does to railroads. First, the
statute speaks of "essential transportation service"'
There can be no doubt that rail transportation is essential to our in-
tegrated, industrial society whose very foundation is rapid, uninterrupted
communication. "Essential" when applied to the air carrier, on the other
hand, is necessarily of a different degree. Air carriers are authorized to fly
routes only when "such transportation is required by the public convenience
and necessity."" Therefore, it logically follows that every air carrier cer-
tified by the Civil Aeronautics Board is, by definition, "essential" in the
sense that the term is used in the statute.
Assuming, then, that an air carrier is forced to curtail its service be-
cause of labor difficulties, that the Mediation Board finds a threat to com-
merce and informs the President who thereupon creates an emergency fact-
finding board, can a question of the emergency board's jurisdiction be raised
during the' investigation by the board? The present board evidently thought
not, declining to rule on it.12 The Act refers to the President's discretion.
Whether this is reviewable by any court appears doubtful, especially when
the only purpose it serves once exercised is to "mobilize public opinion". 1
Even if, as the carrier contended, the board should have gone into the
question of its power, the company might have had difficulty sustaining its
position on the facts. It appears from the carrier's report to the CAB that
in April 1948, the month before the emergency board was appointed, it was
offering the public less than fifty percent of the space it had available in
April, 1947.14 Nor did this situation improve appreciably in the subsequent
months.
THE ALPA CASE
There is adequate basis for concluding that the conduct of the carrier
in its relati6ns with ALPA in the O'Neal case was a violation of its statutory
duty to bargain under the Railway Labor Act, as amended. The Act re-
quires the carrier "to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain
agreements .. . and to settle all disputes .. . in order to avoid any in-
terruption to commerce . . ."15 The arbitrary action of the carrier in ob-
11 The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, §401(d) (1), 52 Stat. 937, as amended
by 54 Stat. 1233 (1940), 49 USCA §481 (Supp. 1947).
12 Although the issue was presented by both parties in their briefs to the
Emergency Board, the Board did not consider it in their Report to the President.
Is House of Representatives, Report of Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, H.R. Rep. No. 328, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926). As to executive
discretion and its reviewability by the judiciary, see Chicago & Southern Air Lines
v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111, 113 (1947), (grant of foreign
air route); United States v. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 380 (1940), (fixing tariff'
standards); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936),
(finding that prohibition of sale of arms would help reestablish peace) ; Dakota
Central Telephone Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 163, 184 (1919), (determining
essentialness to security and defense in seizing telephone lines); Monongahela
Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177, 195 (1910), (determination of an ob-
struction to commerce and navigation); Martin v. Molt, 25 U.S. 12, 19 (1827),
(ascertaining an emergency to call out the militia).
14 CAB Recurrent Reports of Mileage and Traffic Data, April, 1948, sheets
for National Air Lines, domestic and foreign service; Eastern Air Lines, domes-
tic and foreign service; and Delta Airlines.
15 Title I, §2, First, 48 Stat. 1186 (1934), 45 USCA §152 (1940). This sec-
tion is made applicable to air carriers by Title II, §202, 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45
USCA §182 (1940). The Emergency Board found: "The evidence establishes
that this statutory duty has not been performed by the Carrier. Over the entire
-period from the date of O'Neal's discharge, September 27, 1945, to the date of the
strike, February 3, 1948, everyone of the many efforts to dispose of the dispute
was initiated by the Association; in no instance did the Carrier take the initiative
and it was induced to act at all only when confronted by the threat of a strike.
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jecting to the second neutral appointed by the Mediation Board seems to
typify the attitude of the carrier towards collective bargaining procedures. 16
Reasonable effort transcends capricious exercise of privileges. 17 It also ap-
pears from the facts that on at least two occasions the carrier was induced
to take action only after the threat of a strike vote. This, in itself, is not
unusual, but it cannot be said to be indicatory of willingness to cooperate
with the recognized bargaining agent.' 8
The carrier charged as an affirmative defense that ALPA had violated
the act by going on strike while the Mediation Board was in contact with
the parties and attempting to prevent an interruption to essential trans-
portation service, thereby going directly in the face of the avowed purposes
of the Act.19 The Act was passed to prevent strikes in the railroad industry
which lead to interruptions in interstate commerce. However, it is doubt-
ful that the Congress which passed the original Act intended it to restrict
the employees' right to strike in any material manner in order to effect the
purposes of the Act.20 Therefore, the more compelling consideration is that
the carrier's attitude was not conducive to peaceful labor relations in inter-
state commerce, and that it had violated its statutory duty to "exert every
reasonable effort" to settle its disputes.
THE IAM CASE
The case against the carrier for violating the Railway Labor Act, as
amended, by its tactics toward the IAM is well supported by decisions under
What was sought by the Association was reasonable. It did not seek reinstate-
ment of O'Neal. It sought only an impartial determination of the propriety of
his discharge. Such a determination has not been had to this date. Failure
to afford it caused the strike, and responsibility for the strike rests with the
Carrier." Emergency Board No. 62's Report to the President, pp. 12-13. For a
survey of the carrier's duties and obligations under the Railway Labor Act, as
amended, see Elggren and McCraith, Aviation ABC's of the Railway Labor Act,
13 J. Air L. & C. 39 (1942).
10 The Emergency Board, agreeing with the union that the Mediation Board's
first choice -was an unfortunate one, stated: "It is elementary that authority to
appoint a neutral to determine a dispute is not exhausted by a single nomination
and that if the first nominee does not act, successive nominations may be made.
The authority is determined only when it has been effectively executed." Emer-
gency Board No. 62's Report to the President, p. 14.
17 The Emergency Board concluded: "The story revealed by the evidence is
one of disregard for statutory and contractual obligations on the part of the
Carrier. It indicates an immaturity and lack of responsibility which is not con-
sistent with the duties imposed by Congress upon carriers in Interstate Com-
merce." Emergency Board No. 62's Report to the President, pp. 14-15.
18 The Supreme Court in speaking of the duties under the statute stated:
"The statute does not undertake to compel agreement between the employer and
employees, but it does command those preliminary steps without which no agree-
ment can be reached. It at least requires the employer to meet and confer with
the authorized representative of its employees, to listen to their complaints, to
make reasonable effort to compose differences - in short, to enter into a nego-
tiation for the settlement of labor disputes such as is contemplated by section 2,
First." Virginian Ry. Co. v. Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 548 (1937). Emer-
gency Board No. 62's Report to the President, pp. 12-13.
1948 Stat. 1186 (1934), 45 USCA §151a (1940). "The purposes of the Act
are: (1) To avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier
engaged therein; (2) to forbid any limitation upon freedom of association among
employees or any denial, as a condition of employment or otherwise, of the right
of employees to join a labor organization; (3) to provide for the complete inde-
pendence of carriers and of employees in the matter of self-organization to carry
out the purposes of this Act; (4) to provide for the prompt and orderly settle-
ment of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions; (5)
to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of
grievances or out of the interpretations or application of agreements covering
rates of pay, rules, or working conditions."
20 Note the recognized restriction on the right to strike in the Act, cited note
38 infra.
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that Act itself and the National Labor Relations Act.21 The carrier, by en-
couraging a "company union" through its offer of free legal services, went
directly against the mandate of section 2, Fourth, of Title I of the Act. 22
Under this same provision any attempt on the part of the carrier's president
to induce his employees to refrain from joining the union is prohibited.
This sort of suasion would have constituted an unfair labor practice under
the Wagner Act, and would have been evidence of a lack of good faith at
"the collective bargaining table". 23 The Taft-Hartley Act unambiguously
modified this sector of Congressional collective bargaining philosophy by
providing in section 8(c) that such expressions unaccompanied by a "threat
of reprisal or force or promise of benefits" shall not constitute an unfair
labor practice or be evidence thereof.24
One conclusion which might be drawn is that, whereas the "employee-
coercing" provisions of the Railway Labor Act and the Wagner Act are
consistent manifestations of Congressional attitude on the subject, the more
recent Taft-Hartley Act has set a standard for judging employer coercion
different from that which is still being applied to rail and air carriers, for
with the carriers, "an employer stand" on the union question may still be
used as evidence of his failure to bargain collectively in good faith.
25
21 The Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 USCA §151 et seq. (1940). Cases
cited note 22 infra.
2248 Stat. 1186 (1934), 45 USCA §152 (1940). ".. it shall be unlawful for
any carrier to interfere in any way with the organization of its employees, or to
use the funds of the carrier in maintaining or assisting or contributing to any
labor organization, labor representative, or other agency of collective bargaining,
or in performing any work therefor, or to influence or coerce employees in an
effort to induce them to join or remain or not to join or remain members of any
labor organization. .. "
23 I.A.M. v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 72, 78 (1940); N.L.R.B. v. Peterson, 157 F.
(2d) 514, 515 (CCA 6th 1946) cert. denied, 330 U.S. 838 (1947); N.L.R.B. v.
American Pearl Button Co., 149 F. (2d) 311, 315 (CCA 6th 1945); N.L.R.B. v.
Laister Kaufman, 144 F. (2d) 916 (CCA 8th 1944); N.L.R.B. v. Cleveland-Cliffs
Iron Co., 133 F. (2d) 295, 301 (CCA 6th 1943); N.L.R.B. v. Falk Corp., 102 F.(2d) 382, 389 (CCA 7th 1939). Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.,
314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941) ; cases collected in 146 A.L.R. 1017 (1943). Sinsheimer,
Employer Free Speech, 14 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 617, (1947).
24 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 USCA s158 et seq. (Supp. 1947). Note that those
industries under the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, as amended, are
specifically exempted from both the Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 450 (1935), 29 USCA
§152 (2) (1940), and the Taft-Hartley Act 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 USCA §152(3) (Supp. 1947). The Emergency Board did not comment on the possible influ-
ence of the Taft-Hartley philosophy on the term "collective bargaining" as it is
used in the Railway Labor Act, as amended.
The Board concluded: "In its dealings with the Association, National has
repeatedly been guilty of conduct which violated the provisions of the Railway
Labor Act. Identical conduct, in the statutory setting of the National Labor
Relations Act, is uniformly held to constitute 'unfair labor practices,' and to
warrant the enforced reinstatement of the striking employes. The Carrier's
disregard of its statutory duty was not isolated or accidental; on the contrary, it
was repeated and deliberate. And it contributed directly and immediately to the
situation out of which the strike arose. It is, therefore, the recommendation of
the Board that the employes who have refused to work during the pendency of the
strike should be reinstated as working employees of the Carrier." Emergency
Board No. 62's Report to the President, p. 28.
25 Compare Texas & N. 0. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Clerks, 281 U.S.
548 (1930) and Virginia Ry. Co. v. Federation No. 40, 84 F. (2d) 641, 643-644
(CCA 4th 1936) with the viewpoint expressed in Mulroy, The Taft-Hartley Act
in Action, U. of Chi. L. Rev. 595, 611-615 (1948). It is not sufficient to say that
the transportation industry is to be judged by a different standard than the rest
of industry, for the Supreme Court has stated that the Congressional philosophy
of collective bargaining as embodied in the National Labor Relations Act, is
analogous to that embodied in the Railway Labor Act, as amended. "Collective
bargaining was not defined by the statute which provided for it, but it generally
has been considered to absorb and give statutory approval to the philosophy of
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Collective bargaining, by definition, precludes unilateral action.26 Al-
though the carrier refused to discuss any of the employment improvements
which were subsequently granted unilaterally until the matter of sub-con-
tracting had been settled, negotigations were in progress with a certified
bargaining agent. The carrier claimed that its action in raising wages and
granting vacation benefits did not violate the Act in that the beneficiaries
were not covered by an agreement, hence was not within the prohibitions
of the Act.27 Even though the IAM employees were not covered by a con-
tract, such action still is indicative of a lack of bargaining collectively in
good faith.28 Section 2, Ninth, of Title I of the Railway Labor Act, as
amended, makes it mandatory for an employer to "treat with" the certified
representative of his employees. 29 Therefore, it appears that the carrier's
unilateral action under these circumstances was a violation of its statutory
duty to bargain.80
The carrier's most potent argument was that the IAM had violated sec-
tion 5 of Title I of the Act by calling the strike January 23, 1948.81 It was
the carrier's contention that neither party could change the status quo for
thirty days after the notice that mediatory efforts had failed. The Mediation
Board gave such notice on the 21st of January. The IAM interpreted the
statute to mean that, if this section applied to unions at all, the status.quo
could not be altered until thirty days after arbitration had been rejected,
which, in fact, occurred some 42 days previously.
Looking at the Railway Labor Act as a whole it contemplates first, that
the parties exercise reasonable efforts to compromise their differences ;82
secondly, should this fail, the Mediation Board shall attempt to bring about
a reconciliation; thirdly, if there is no settlement resulting from these ef-
forts, the Board shall endeavor "as its final required action" (except for the
bargaining as worked out in the labor movement in the United States." Telegra-
phers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 346-347 (1944). To the same
effect: General Committee v. M.K.T.R. Co., 320 U.S. 323, 335 (1944); J. I. Case
v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 514, 523-526 (1940) ; Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship
Clerks v. Virginia Ry. Co., 125 F. (2d) 853 (CCA 4th 1942).
20 "Such unilateral action minimizes the influence of organized bargaining.
It interferes with the right of self-organization by emphasizing to the employees
that there is no necessity for a collective bargaining agent. If successful in
securing approval for the proposed increase of wages, it might well ... block the
bargaining representative in securing further wage adjustments." May Depart-
ment Stores v. N.L.R.B., 326 U.S. 376, 385 (1945).
"But orderly collective bargaining requires that the employer be not per-
mitted to go behind the designated representatives, in order to bargain with the
employees themselves, prior to such a revocation" of the bargaining agent. Medo
Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 678, 684-685 (1944).27 Title I, §2, Seventh, 48 Stat. 1186 (1934), 45 USCA §152 (1940) provides:
"No carrier, its officer, or agents shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions of its employees, as a class as embodied in agreements except in the
manner prescribed in such agreements. . . ." (emphasis supplied).
28 "Most significant was the action of Cayia (the company superintendent)
in announcing the vacation rule two days before the May 10th meeting (with the
bargaining representative), when it was to be the subject of bargaining between
the employer and the union. This action was more than merely tactless. It evi-
denced a wilful and deliberate contempt for the whole plan of collective bar-
gaining." Inland Lime & Stone Co. v. N.L.R.B., 119 F. (2d) 20 (CCA 7th 1941).
29 Virginian Ry. Co. v. Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 545 (1937). See
pp. 9-10 of MeNatt article cited note 2, supra.
30 "By its unilateral actions concerning matters properly the subject of col-
lective bargaining, National Airlines violated the duty imposed upon it by stat-
ute. National's persistent and repeated violations of the duties imposed upon it
by Congress in the public interest were the major factors in the development of
the existing dispute." Emergency Board No. 62's Report to the President, p. 24.
31 48 Stat. 1195 (1934), 45 USCA §155 (1940).
3248 Stat. 1186 (1934), 45 USCA §152 (1943). See Thirteenth Annual
Report, National Mediation Board (1947), pp. 2, 41.
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action provided for in section 10 of the Act) "to induce the parties to sub-
mit ... to arbitration"; fourthly, if arbitration is refused, "the Board shall
at once notify both parties in writing that its mediatory efforts have failed
and for thirty days thereafter, ... no change shall be made in wages, work-
ing conditions or established practices in effect prior to the time the dispute
arose."83
Applying the facts of the IAM case to the above summary, the question
is: can the union go on strike after thirty days from the date arbitration is
refused, but before the Mediation Board sends notice that mediatory efforts
have failed?
The first inquiry necessary to finding the answer is whether the pro-
vision prohibiting change has force against the union as well as the carrier,
or whether it applies to the carrier alone. Or phrased in a different man-
ner: do the terms "working conditions" and "established practices" include
strikes? Presumably, if the purposes of the Act are to be effectuated, they
must.3 4 The legislative intent, however, appears to the contrary. It seems
that the Railway Labor Act before the 1934 amendment did not contain a
clause providing for Mediation Board action when arbitration was refused.85
Prior to the amendment the railroads made a practice of granting benefits
to their employees to thwart threatening strikes. The 1934 addition to the
Act was aimed at this circumvention.38 Force is given to this reasoning
by noting the difference between the clause appended in 1934 and a similar
provision in section 10 of Title I of the Act.3 7 The prohibition in this section
is directed towards both parties to the dispute.88 One could significantly
ask why, if Congress wanted the amending clause to be binding on both
parties, it did not use the same language it used in section 10 of the Act.89
83 Title I, 5, First, 48 Stat. 1186 (1934), 45 USCA §155 (1940). Also, see
Title I, §7, 48 Stat. 1197 (1934), 45 USCA §157 (1940).
84 Statute cited Note 18, supra.
85 Virginian Ry. Co. v. Federation No. 40, 84 F. (2d) 641, 625 (CCA 4th
1936).
36 Joseph B. Eastman, who was then Federal Coordinator of Transportation,
stated, "As the present act reads, a railroad, by rejecting the Board of Mediation's
final recommendation to arbitrate the dispute, is enabled to change the rates of
pay, rules, or working conditions arbitrarily, prior to the issuance of an order by
the President appointing a fact-finding board and maintaining the status quo for
60 days. The only way the employees can now guard against this possibility is
for them to be forehanded and arm themselves with a strike vote prior to the
termination of mediation, obviously a very unsatisfactory expedient, so as to
enable the Board of Mediation to certify to the President that an interruption
to interstate commerce threatens, thus enabling him in turn to issue an executive
order before the railroad can change the status quo. The railroads have taken
advantage of this unintentional hiatus in the present law in several instances.
The change now proposed is designed to plug this hole." See also Hearings before
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives,
May 22 et seq., 1934, on page 50.
87 48 Stat. 1197 (1934), 45 USCA §160 (1940). "After the creation of such
board and for thirty days after such board has made its report to the President,
no change, except by agreement, shall be made by the parties to the controversy
in the conditions out of which the dispute arose (emphasis supplied)."
88 Texas & N. 0. Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Clerks, 281 U.S. 548
565-567 (1930). ("It is thus apparent that Congress, in the legislation of 1926,
while elaborating a plan for amicable adjustments and voluntary arbitration of
disputes between common carriers and their employees, thought it necessary to
impose, and'did impose, certain definite obligations enforceable by judicial pro-
ceedings.")
39 For the Congressional intent of §i0 see Hearings before the House of
Representatives Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. Rep. No.
328, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926). Cf. Emergency Board No. 62's Report to the
President, pp. 24-26 (the Board felt that §5 was not binding on both parties, that
"wages, working conditions, and established practices" were within the exclusive
control of the carrier.)
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For the purposes of argument assuming that the section 5 amendment
is meant to be binding on both the parties, then, when does the thirty day
period begin to run? Does it begin after arbitration is refused or after the
Mediation Board sends its notice? Grammatically, "if arbitration ... shall
be refused" is the introductory clause to the provision, and would seem to
be a condition precedent to the two following conditions, namely, that the
Board shall give notice of its failure of mediatory efforts, and secondly, that
no changes shall be made in the rates of pay, working conditions, etc. This
would mean that the thirty days would begin to run from the date arbitration
is refused. The words "and for thirty days" are followed by the word
"thereafter" which must refer to the Board's giving notice, which is found
in the same clause. What was presupposed, then, was that notice of the
failure of mediatory efforts and the refusal of arbitration were to be simul-
taneous. The giving of notice by the Mediation Board must be a ministerial
duty to inform the parties. Failure of the Board to execute this duty
probably was not intended to bind the parties. Therefore, from the facts
of this case, i.e., where the refusal to arbitrate came more than thirty days
before the notice that the Board's efforts had failed, the union, even if it
were bound by this provision, would not violate the Act by going on strike
when it did.
CONCLUSION
It seems evident that the carrier violated applicable provisions of the
Railway Labor Act, as the Emergency Board so found. 40 The carrier's
arguments which would have read Taft-Hartley leniency into the Act applica-
ble to air carriers have dissipated in view of recent Congressional activity in
the field of labor law unless some Taft-Hartley policy is retained in the new
bill. Section 401(1) (4) of the Civil Aeronautics Act provides: "It shall be
a condition upon the holding of a certificate by any air carrier that such
carrier shall comply with title II of the Railway Labor Act, as amended.41
Given a violation of the Act, the ramifications of this statute are -open to
speculation. 42
WALTER S. DAVIS, JR.*
40 "A) The Board, therefore, recommends that the striking pilots be rein-
stated as working employes. b) The Board further recommends that paragraph(m), page 23, of the agreement between National Airlines, Inc., and the Air Line
Pilots in the service of the National Airlines, Inc., effective December 9, 1941 be
amended and supplemented to the end that in case the said System Board of
Adjustment becomes deadlocked and unable'to reach a decision on any matter
properly coming before it, either party may thereupon petition the National
Mediation Board for the appointment of a neutral referee to sit with the System
Board of Adjustment, as a member thereof. Such System Board of Adjustment
as then constituted shall hear the parties with reference to the dispute pending
before it, de novo, and a majority vote of the Board shall be final and conclusive
between the parties. c) The Board also recommends that the O'Neal dispute be
finally determined pursuant to the agreement of the parties dated May 14, 1947,
by the System Board of Adjustment augmented by a neutral member to be ap-
pointed by the National Mediation Board." Emergency Board No. 62's Report
to the President, pp. 15-16.
41 52 Stat. 937 (1938), 49 USCA §481 (1943).
42 The pilots strike remained unsettled. On September 28, 1948, the CAB
initiated a formal investigation to consider the advisability of awarding Nation-
al's routes to other carriers. CAB Order, Serial E-2025. Subsequently, the pilot
strike was settled by mediation in which James M. Landis, former Chairman of
CAB, played a major role. American Aviation Daily, Nov. 26, 1948, p. 136.
The settlement involved a plan whereby deadlocks in the system board of adjust-
ment will be abolished by the appointment of an arbiter. Mr. Behncke, President
of ALPA, indicated that this procedure might be written into all future airline
contracts.
* Member of the Northwestern University Legal Publications Board, North-
western University.
